tjpass1 · Ed25519

TrackJet Passport

A signed export of a shipment's recorded history that anyone can verify offline with the public key below — no TrackJet contact needed. Paste a passport at /verify or verify independently.

Document format

{
  "spec": "tjpass1",
  "alg": "Ed25519",
  "payload_b64":    base64( payload JSON bytes ),
  "signature_b64":  base64( Ed25519 signature over EXACTLY those bytes ),
  "public_key_b64": base64( signer key — informative; verify against the published key )
}

The payload carries the shipment snapshot: events, the Verifiable-Timeline chain digest (tjvt1), attestations and issued_at. The signature covers the exact payload bytes — no canonicalisation step, no ambiguity: one altered byte invalidates the document.

Published verification key

ZyBB0RqHh1kvHxCyZQJ0pu2gvuApzRST7LTQTWVFMcw=

Machine-readable: /.well-known/trackjet-passport.json

Independent verification (no TrackJet code)

# Python — pip install pynacl
import json, base64
from nacl.signing import VerifyKey
doc = json.load(open("passport.json"))
vk  = VerifyKey(base64.b64decode("ZyBB0RqHh1kvHxCyZQJ0pu2gvuApzRST7LTQTWVFMcw="))
vk.verify(base64.b64decode(doc["payload_b64"]), base64.b64decode(doc["signature_b64"]))
print(json.loads(base64.b64decode(doc["payload_b64"])))  # raises if ONE byte changed

What it proves — and what it doesn't

• Proves: TrackJet signed this exact snapshot (events, chain digest, attestations) at issued_at — the document was not altered afterwards, by anyone.
• Does not prove: that the carrier's original data was correct. Same boundary as the Verifiable Timeline.
• Export: account holders, from a saved shipment ("Export Passport"). Printable HTML; PDF export is deferred (no new dependencies policy).